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WRITING IT RIGHT

How Not to File a Complaint
By Douglas E. Abrams
A few years ago, H. Michael
Stanard and his company, One Zero
Charlie Productions, built an outdoor
amphitheater on his property in rural
Illinois and began hosting public events
there. But all was not clear sailing.
Stanard alleged that the county sheriff
forced him to provide security at these
events by hiring off-duty deputies at
inflated wages, and threatened to close
the road leading to the amphitheater if
he refused to make these hires.1
Stanard’s allegations raised the
specter of serious official misconduct,
but the property owner never got his
day in court. After more than a year
of skirmishing and false starts, the
federal district judge dismissed the
case with prejudice because Stanard’s
lawyer, Walter P. Maksym of Chicago,
failed three times to draft a complaint
minimally passable under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The 7th Circuit affirmed the dismissal
order because the second amended
complaint remained “far outside the
bounds of acceptable legal writing.”2
“Each iteration of the complaint was
generally incomprehensible and riddled
with errors, making it impossible for the
defendants to know what wrongs they
were accused of committing.”3

Simplicity and Standards

The Stanard fiasco’s common sense
lesson is that, despite the Federal
Rules’ accent on notice pleading
rather than the hyper-technicality that
plagued earlier common law and code
pleading, the Rules demand competent,
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meticulous writing from counsel.4 The
pleadings must contain “a short and
plain statement” of the claim and any
defenses, as the case may be.5 “Each
allegation must be simple, concise, and
direct.”6 Because the Rules “should
be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and
proceeding,”7 these commands have
teeth.
Under Rule 15, “[t]he court should
freely give leave [to amend a pleading]
when justice so requires.”8 The Supreme
Court has held, however, that district
courts retain “broad discretion to
deny leave to amend where there is
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies,
undue prejudice to the defendants, or
where amendment would be futile.”9
In Stanard, the district court finally lost
patience with lawyer Maksym, who
ran afoul of each of these criteria by
“prov[ing] unable to file an intelligible”
complaint after three tries, the initial
complaint and two amendments.10
Wherever possible, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure favor judgments on the
merits, and not on procedural infirmity.11
The overarching contemporary vision
perceives procedure as the means for
securing judicial resolution under the
substantive law, and not as an end in
itself. Writing that is less than stellar
normally does not produce dismissal
with prejudice, but (as plaintiff Stanard
learned the hard way) sometimes the
lawyer’s performance falls persistently
below a minimal threshold of competence
that courts are willing to accept.

“Incomprehensible and
Riddled With Errors”

Michael Stanard’s original 52-page
multi-count complaint contained “a
number of obviously frivolous claims,”
and failed to specify which of more
than two dozen defendants were liable
under each of the other claims.12 Lawyer
Maksym ignored court orders to respond
to defense motions, missed several
deadlines, sometimes sought extensions
of time, and sometimes filed responses
barely minutes before the court’s
deadline would expire. When the lawyer
finally filed the first amended complaint,
his effort was “haphazard at best” and
still marked by “basic incoherence.”13
Lawyer Maksym reached the end
of the road, however, for reasons that
transcended recalcitrance and legal
insufficiency. When it affirmed the
district court’s dismissal with prejudice
of the second amended complaint, the
7th Circuit stressed that “unintelligibility
is certainly a legitimate reason” for
denying leave to amend a pleading.14
Writing for the panel, Judge Diane Sykes
catalogued five failures that marked
Maksym’s latest submission:






Lack of punctuation (“At least
23 sentences contained 100 or
more words.”) Judge Sykes drew
particular attention to a “staggering
and incomprehensible” 345-word
sentence that consumed more than
30 lines in the Federal Reporter;15
Near incomprehensibility (“Much
of the writing is little more than
gibberish.”);
Failure to follow basic directions
(“Given three attempts to file a
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proper complaint, Maksym could
not even bring himself to correct the
errors catalogued by the district court
following the first two rejections.”);
Failure to put defendants on notice
(“Despite the complaint’s length –
or perhaps in part because of it – it
remains unclear what constitutes the
core of the claims against Nygren
and the other defendants.”); and
Grammatical and syntactical errors
(“The district court put it best: ‘The
grammatical and spelling errors’ are
‘too numerous to add “[sic]” where
required.’”).16

To make matters worse for lawyer
Maksym, when he sought to salvage his
client’s case and his own professional
reputation on appeal, the 7th Circuit
found his appellate brief “woefully
deficient”17 and marked by “[a]ll the
deficiencies that plagued the various
versions of the complaint.”18 By that
time, the journey from law office to the
clerk’s office had already left the road
strewn with casualties, including the
lawyer himself.
Plaintiff Stanard lost his opportunity
for judicial resolution after months
of procedural skirmishing that likely
saddled him with hefty attorneys’ fees,
but with little remaining opportunity
for relief except a potential malpractice
action against his lawyer. A malpractice
action would start the expensive and
emotionally draining litigation roller
coaster anew, a prospect that clients do
not anticipate when they retain counsel
to secure relief in federal court.
Lawyer Maksym did not emerge
unscathed, either. He told the Chicago
Tribune that he was struggling with
serious health issues while representing
Mr. Stanard, 19 but the 7th Circuit
panel concluded that the lawyer’s
performance in the case raised “serious

questions about his competence to
practice before” the court. The panel
ordered him to show cause why he
should not be suspended from the court’s
bar or otherwise disciplined under Rule
46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.20 The panel also directed
the clerk to send a copy of its opinion
to Illinois bar authorities for possible
disciplinary action.21

Conclusion: A Lawyer’s
Principal Asset

In most years when I taught civil
procedure, I would incorporate a
practical drafting component into
doctrinal instruction, lest the students
leave the course lulled into complacency
that the Federal Rules’ accent on notice
pleading somehow relaxes standards for
competent research and writing.22 The
practical lesson was that although Rule
8(e) instructs courts that “[p]leadings
must be construed so as to do justice,”23
generous construction has its limits.
Cases such as Stanard remain extreme
for both the magnitude of the lawyer’s
failures and the force of the court’s
public reaction, but extreme cases
sometimes elicit valuable universal
lessons. Regardless of any details that
might emerge about lawyer Maksym’s
health issues, the overarching lesson here
transcends this particular case. Shoddy
pre-trial writing can compromise a
lawyer’s reputation because trial and
appellate courts alike sometimes go
public with their criticism.
The court may identify the offending
lawyer by name in its opinion or order,
as the court did 55 times in Stanard.
In another recent decision, Nault v.
Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan
Foundation,24 the federal district judge’s
order twice identified the plaintiff’s
lawyer by name for filing motion papers
that were “riddled with unprofessional

grammatical and typographical errors
that nearly render the entire Motion
incomprehensible.”25 The Nault judge
even ordered that the lawyer personally
hand deliver to his client a copy of the
order and the court’s mark-up of the
motion papers, showing the errors.26
Even where the lawyer goes unnamed
in the court’s opinion or order, readers
can easily determine his or her identity
by glancing at the list of appearances
that follow the case’s caption. In
Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch
Independent School District, 27 for
example, the opinion of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 5th Circuit left the lawyer
unnamed, but also left no doubt about
the panel’s condemnation: “Usually
we do not comment on technical and
grammatical errors, because anyone can
make such an occasional mistake, but
here the miscues are so egregious and
obvious that an average fourth grader
would have avoided most of them.”28
Whether or not the court identifies
the lawyer by name, the damage is
done because word gets around. In
cities, suburbs and outstate areas alike,
the practicing bar usually reduces itself
to a relatively discrete group bound
by bar association memberships, other
mutual relationships, word of mouth,
recollections, and past experiences. The
specialization that characterizes much of
contemporary law practice may constrict
the circle still further.
A court’s public criticism becomes
a permanent mark readily available to
other lawyers who follow the advance
sheets or the professional and popular
media. Westlaw, Lexis and other
electronic research sources transmit the
mark even wider.
At stake is personal reputation, which
Judge Hugh R. Jones of the New York
Court of Appeals appropriately called
“a lawyer’s . . . principal asset.”29 A
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lawyer’s reputation, wrote Chief Judge
Benjamin N. Cardozo when he sat on
that court decades earlier, “is a plant of
tender growth, and its bloom, once lost,
is not easily restored.”30
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Why I Volunteer
(from page 47)

Endnotes

1 Faculty advisor to Phi Theta Kappa, the
National Junior College Honor Society, St. Louis
Community College-Forest Park Campus, St.
Louis, Missouri.
2 See Pirke Avos/Ethics of the Fathers 4:1
in Babylonian Talmud Nezikim/On the Law
of Damages. Pirke Avois is composed of six
chapters devoted to how to lead an ethical life.
It is a guidepost for everyday living, and within
it Pirke Avois stresses volunteerism.
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